"Indeed, as many have pointed out, the reliability of our philosophical beliefs about subjective experiences seems to require that subjective experiences affect our beliefs."
I think this challenge might be caused by trying to combine epiphenomenalist dualism with a physicalist conception of subjects and beliefs, but once we embrace a phenomenological conception of subjects & beliefs, the relationship between our beliefs and our subjective experience becomes constitutive, not causal.
Interesting, thanks! I think I buy that this response might work for explaining the _justification_ for our beliefs about subjective experiences. It still seems in tension with what we know about how our beliefs-as-third-person-facts tend to track our subjective experiences, though. But I find this confusing
My mental model of that is something like: Suppose that I currently have a subjective experience X, my belief-as-third-person-facts about X is causally downstream of the neural correlates of X, and in turn the psychophysical laws map that belief-as-third-person-fact to a belief-as-phenomenal-experience about X
"Indeed, as many have pointed out, the reliability of our philosophical beliefs about subjective experiences seems to require that subjective experiences affect our beliefs."
I think this challenge might be caused by trying to combine epiphenomenalist dualism with a physicalist conception of subjects and beliefs, but once we embrace a phenomenological conception of subjects & beliefs, the relationship between our beliefs and our subjective experience becomes constitutive, not causal.
https://philpapers.org/rec/YETDAT
Interesting, thanks! I think I buy that this response might work for explaining the _justification_ for our beliefs about subjective experiences. It still seems in tension with what we know about how our beliefs-as-third-person-facts tend to track our subjective experiences, though. But I find this confusing
My mental model of that is something like: Suppose that I currently have a subjective experience X, my belief-as-third-person-facts about X is causally downstream of the neural correlates of X, and in turn the psychophysical laws map that belief-as-third-person-fact to a belief-as-phenomenal-experience about X