Fwiw, I just stumbled upon this https://philpapers.org/archive/RUSPFP-3.pdf. I only skimmed but it seems to make a vaguely similar point, focusing on being wary of "mistakes" rather than indeterminacy/imprecision.
> What are the exact numbers defining each distribution? If my sense of those numbers is vague, it seems like I won’t have a definitive range of numbers to average out — and small differences in these ranges might matter a lot, since again, we’re comparing very tiny probabilities!
Say I tell you I have a [0, 99]% credence that God A is more likely than God C. Would you say that my beliefs are "not indeterminate enough" and that I should just say [0, 100]% or "I have no idea" instead? Or would you say that a [0, 99]% credence doesn't qualify as indeterminate to begin with?
That seems indeterminate enough to me. The "tiny probabilities" in question are about the likelihood of the gods themselves, to be clear, not the higher-order probability of "God A is more likely than God C."
Fwiw, I just stumbled upon this https://philpapers.org/archive/RUSPFP-3.pdf. I only skimmed but it seems to make a vaguely similar point, focusing on being wary of "mistakes" rather than indeterminacy/imprecision.
Neat, thanks! Incidentally I also found the latter sections of this post relevant: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/s/t6CApfeWtyreifyDd/p/N2FQihzG6SW5BfvtS
Great post! :)
> What are the exact numbers defining each distribution? If my sense of those numbers is vague, it seems like I won’t have a definitive range of numbers to average out — and small differences in these ranges might matter a lot, since again, we’re comparing very tiny probabilities!
Say I tell you I have a [0, 99]% credence that God A is more likely than God C. Would you say that my beliefs are "not indeterminate enough" and that I should just say [0, 100]% or "I have no idea" instead? Or would you say that a [0, 99]% credence doesn't qualify as indeterminate to begin with?
That seems indeterminate enough to me. The "tiny probabilities" in question are about the likelihood of the gods themselves, to be clear, not the higher-order probability of "God A is more likely than God C."